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According to the traditional view, both imageability and concreteness ratings reflect the
way word meanings rely on information mediated by the senses. As a consequence, the
two measures should and do correlate. The link between these two indexes was already
hypothesized and demonstrated by Paivio et al. (1968) in a seminal article, where they
introduced the idea of imageability ratings for the first time. However, in this first study,
they also noted a contrasting pattern in the ratings for imageability and concreteness with
some words that refer to affective attitudes or emotional states receiving high imageability
but low concreteness ratings. Recent studies confirm this inconsistency (e.g., Altarriba
and Bauer, 2004) leading to the claim that emotion words form a particular class of terms
different from both concrete and abstract words. Here we use the MRC psycholinguistic
database to show that the there are other classes of terms for which imageability and
concreteness are uncorrelated. We show that the common feature of these word classes
is that they directly or indirectly refer to proprioceptive, interoceptive, or affective states,
i.e., to internal, body-related, sensory experiences. Thus, imageability and concreteness
can no longer be considered interchangeable constructs; rather, imageability is a different,
and perhaps more interesting, measure: it not only reflects the ease with which memories
of external events come to mind, as previously hypothesized, but also reflects the ease
with which memories of internal events come to mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Analogously to frequency and familiarity, concreteness, and
imageability are properties of words (referents) that are partially
intertwined. According to the traditional view, both imageabil-
ity and concreteness ratings reflect the way word meanings rely
on information mediated by the senses. For this reason, they
are the most relevant operational constructs to address the ques-
tion of the processing differences between concrete and abstract
words, i.e., between words denoting things that can be perceived
by the senses and words that do not have this kind of reference.
Since they are hypothesized to detect analogous properties, the
two measures should strongly correlate, as indeed they do. And
because of this strong correlation, in experiments for the selection
of concrete vs. abstract verbal material they are often used inter-
changeably (see e.g., Reilly and Kean, 2007; Connell and Lynott,
2012).
The link between these two indexes was already hypothesized
and demonstrated by Paivio et al. (1968), who introduced the idea
of imageability ratings for the first time. However, already in this
study a contrasting pattern was reported and has not yet been fully
accounted for: a number of words referring mainly to affective
attitudes or emotional states received high imageability ratings
but low concreteness ratings. Recent studies confirm this anomaly
(e.g., Altarriba et al., 1999;Wiemer-Hastings et al., 2001; Altarriba
and Bauer, 2004; Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 2005) and maintain
that emotion words form a particular class of terms different from
both concrete and abstract terms.
In this paper we present an account of this presumed inconsis-
tency arguing that imageability ratings measure not only whether
(how much) words rely on external sensory information, but also
whether (how much) words rely on internal bodily-related sen-
sory experience. Since imageability ratings are a joint measure of
the link between word meanings and both external and internal
sensory experience, while concreteness ratings measure the link
to external sensory information only, we suggest that an index
of the “weight” internal sensory information has with respect
to the meaning of a word can be obtained by subtracting the
concreteness rating of this word from its imageability rating.
To support this viewwe use theMRCpsycholinguistic database
(Coltheart, 1981; Wilson, 1988). First of all, on the basis of an
analysis of the instructions used when collecting the imageability
ratings included in the database, we suggest that the contrasting
pattern observed with respect to these word classes is due to the
fact that imageability ratings do not only reflect the ease/difficulty
with which people can evoke a mental picture of the instances
denoted by the word, as it commonly assumed (e.g., Vigliocco
et al., 2009; Connell and Lynott, 2012). These instructions might
rather have biased people to assign their imageability ratings on
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the basis of the ease/difficulty with which a word arouses sensory
experience of any kind, including internal, body-related sensa-
tions. Secondly, we analyze the imageability and concreteness
ratings of specific words included in these databases to show
that, in addition to emotion words, there are also other classes
of terms for which imageability and concreteness are uncorre-
lated and that the common feature of all kinds of words exhibiting
this contrasting pattern is that they directly or indirectly refer to
proprioceptive, interoceptive, or affective states, i.e., to internal,
body-related, sensory experiences.
This shows that imageability and concreteness are not inter-
changeable constructs: imagery ratings are not only another
means to assess the degree of concreteness of a word, but they
are also a different, and perhaps more interesting, measure of the
link between a word and some internal information pertaining to
the state the word denotes. Since imageability ratings are a joint
measure of the connections between words and both external
and internal sensory experience, subtracting concreteness from
imageability gives us a tangible measure of the internal sensory
information aroused by a word. Even though this measure cannot
be completely accurate since it is a result of ambiguous norming
instructions, it can still indicate whether a word relies (more or
less heavily) on body-related sensory information. Clearly, new
collections of ratings on the basis of less ambiguous instructions
are required in order to have more precise imageability ratings
to use for experimentation. However, our study indicates a way
to interpret the imageability construct from a new and possi-
bly more fruitful perspective which allows us to both avoid the
incongruities of the old measure and to assess more clearly in
what respects concreteness and imageability converge and in what
respects they instead diverge.
IMAGEABILITY IN THE MRC PSYCHOLINGUISTIC DATABASE
Concrete (CONC) ratings for the MRC psycholinguistic
databases were originally collected by Spreen and Schulz (1966).
With the exception of the most recent database of 2013 (Brysbaert
et al., 2013), later collections are included in the MRC database
and rely on the same definition of concreteness and on the
same instructions. As Spreen and Schulz (1966, p. 459) point
out, starting from the twenties it became clear that there are
differences in remembering, recognizing and understanding
concrete and abstract verbal material. For the study of these
differences they tried to work out a precise scale for concrete and
abstract words, based on a non-ambiguous definition of the two
poles. In fact, previous definitions interpreted the opposition of
abstractness and concreteness in at least two different ways: on
the one hand, in terms of general, i.e., generic vs. specific, and on
the other, in terms of a difference in the nature of the referents of
abstract and concrete terms–the referents of concrete terms are
directly connected to sensory experience, while those of abstract
words lack this connection. Spreen and Schulz (1966) opted for
this last definition and suggested that the scale should measure
whether the referents of a word can or cannot be experienced by
the senses.
The imageability (IMAG) scale was first introduced by Paivio
et al. (1968) as a further measure in addition to CONC to investi-
gate psychological effects of linguistic abstractness-concreteness:
in the context of their study, imagery is postulated to be “the
major effective psychological attribute underlying abstractness-
concreteness” (p. 2). High and low imagery ratings measure the
ease or difficulty with which words arouse sensory images. These
sensory images are defined in a rather vague manner as any kind
of sensory experience evoked by words by recalling non-verbal
representations of their referent. Concreteness is considered to be
determined independently from imagery; however, highly con-
crete words are assumed to have a high image-arousing value,
since they are particularly effective in evoking sensory images
of their referents which, in this case, consist mainly in mental
pictures of them.
The correlation between IMAG and CONC was confirmed by
Paivio et al. (1968) on 925 words. This correlation provided evi-
dence for Paivio’s Dual Code Theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986, 2007),
according to which cognitive processing is carried out on the
basis of two different subsystems, “one specialized for the rep-
resentation and processing of information concerning nonverbal
objects and events, the other specialized for dealing with lan-
guage (Paivio, 1986, p. 53). The nonverbal (symbolic) subsystem
is referred to as the imagery system: “its critical functions include
the analysis of scenes and the generation of mental images (both
functions encompassing other sensory modalities in addition
to visual)” (Paivio, 1986, pp. 53–54). The language-specialized
system is called the verbal system. In Paivio’s perspective, the
nonverbal system of imagery is activated primarily by concrete
(i.e., perceivable) stimuli (Paivio, 1986, p. 68), therefore words
with a high CONC rating should have high IMAG ratings, while
words with a low CONC ratings (i.e., abstract words) should
have low IMAG ratings. According to Paivio, this dual system
can also account for the so-called “concreteness effect,” i.e., the
fact that concrete words are processed more easily and quickly
than abstract words because, while abstract words activate verbal
representations only, concrete words activate representations in
both the verbal and in the imagery system, and this facilitates the
referential act.
The idea that CONC and IMAG are strongly correlated both
theoretically and from the point of view of their ratings has
become established in the literature (Paivio et al., 1968 found
a correlation of 0.83; this correlation has been confirmed using
larger word numbers by several other studies that report val-
ues ranging from 0.64 to 0.95: see e.g., Christian et al., 1978;
Toglia and Battig, 1978; Gilhooly and Logie, 1980; Rubin, 1980;
Friendly et al., 1982; Rubin and Friendly, 1986; Schwanenflugel
et al., 1988; Benjafield and Muckenheim, 1989). This is the rea-
son why these two measures are considered interchangeable and
are both used to study the processing differences between abstract
and concrete verbal material. As e.g., Reilly and Kean (2007) point
out: “Although imageability and concreteness are technically dif-
ferent psycholinguistic constructs, the correlation between these
variables is so strong that many authors use the terms inter-
changeably. Here we make the same assumption of synonymy
between imageability and concreteness in terms of theory (i.e.,
concreteness effects—imageability effects)” (p. 158). The same
point has beenmademore recently by Connell and Lynott (2012):
“Imageability ratings are frequently used interchangeably with
concreteness ratings in the experimental literature [. . .] because
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of their high correlation and theoretical relationship in dual
coding theory” (p. 453).
However, even though the correlation between CONC and
IMAG is quite strong, (a) it is lower than expected and (b) exhibits
some relevant anomalies. As Paivio and colleagues underline: “the
correlation between I and C, although substantial, is not as high
as one might expect if it is assumed that both scales measure the
same underlying variable” (Paivio et al., 1968, p. 7). According to
Paivio et al. (1968) the problem is due to some sets of problem-
atic items whose IMAG ratings are significantly greater than their
CONC ratings1. As they note, these items exhibit an interesting
semantic similarity: “Most of these are words with strong emo-
tional and evaluative connotations. The largest group consists of
terms referring to affective reactions or affective attitudes” (Paivio
et al., 1968, p. 7).
Paivio et al. (1968) do not offer any explanation for the con-
trasting patterns for IMAG andCONC.However they suggest that
also in these cases high IMAG must be due to the fact that the
word easily evokes some kind of sensory experience, which in this
case seems to be of an affective kind: “These words appear to have
the common property of having been associated with sensory
experience (usually affective in nature)” (p. 7). These observa-
tions open the door for the hypothesis also embraced by Paivio
in his later work (1986, p. 79) that affective and emotional words
have a high IMAG rating because they directly evoke the sensory
experience of an affective arousal.
Similar inconsistencies are also pointed out by recent stud-
ies that interpret them in a way analogous to Paivio’s suggesting
that emotion words are different from both abstract and con-
crete words as regards their CONC and IMAG ratings and must
therefore be considered as a particular word class with specific
characteristics (Altarriba et al., 1999; Altarriba and Bauer, 2004;
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 2005). In particular, as the results of
Altrarriba’s study (2004) indicate: “concepts represented by emo-
tion words are more imageable and are easier to of a context for
than abstract words but are less concrete than abstract words.
They are less imageable, less concrete, and less likely to activate
a context than concrete words” (p. 407). Therefore, even though
emotion words are, as one would expect, less CONC than con-
crete words, they turn out to be also less CONC than abstract
words, even though their IMAG is significantly greater than
that of abstract words. Thus, for this word class the divergence
between IMAG and CONC is particularly broad. As a matter of
fact, our analysis of the IMAG and CONC ratings included in the
MRC psycholinguistic database, which has been the main source
for these measures showed that the difference between IMAG and
CONC is significantly greater for emotion terms than for any
other randomly chosen control group of words (we will come
back to this aspect in the next section).
Altarriba et al. (1999), Altarriba and Bauer (2004) emphasize
the fact that examining the unique qualities of emotion words
with respect to other classes of terms is particularly important
1There were also a few terms with high concreteness and low imageability
ratings like e.g., “aster,” “astrolabe” or “stein,” but these are easy to explain:
people know they denote concrete objects, but they do not know what they
look like.
since it helps us understand how people recognize and label emo-
tions. However, we think that the uniqueness of the IMAG and
CONC ratings for emotion words can also help clarify the lin-
guistic construct of imageability which is often considered vague
and subject to different interpretations (e.g., Connell and Lynott,
2012; Westbury et al., 2013; Dellantonio et al., 2014). In fact, the
anomaly of the IMAG and CONC ratings in the case of emotion
words can be explained only by specifying what precisely IMAG
measures and what is the specific difference between the con-
structs of IMAG and CONC. The key point to disentangle in this
respect lies first of all in the content of the instructions given to
subjects for assigning the CONC and the IMAG ratings included
in the MRC database.
INSTRUCTION-BOUND RATINGS?
The original instructions for concreteness ratings were developed
by Spreen and Schulz (1966), and then used in almost the same
form by Paivio et al. (1968): however, while Spreen and Schulz
(1966) labeled the end-points of the rating scales “low concrete-
ness” and “high concreteness,” Paivio et al. (1968) labeled them
“high concreteness” and “high abstractness.” Later collections
used either the one or the other label interchangeably.
Spreen and Schulz’s (1966) instructions for concreteness were:
“Nouns may refer to persons, places, and things that can be seen,
heard, felt, smelled, or tasted or to more abstract concepts that
cannot be experienced by our senses. The purpose of this exper-
iment is to rate a list of words with respect to “concreteness” in
term of sense-experience. Any word that refers to objects, mate-
rial or persons should receive a high concreteness rating; any word
that refers to an abstract concept that cannot be experienced by
the senses should receive a low concreteness rating. Think of the
words “chair” and “independence.” “Chair” can be experienced
by our senses and therefore should be rated as high concrete;
“independence” cannot be experienced by the senses as such and
therefore should be rated as low concrete (abstract)” (p. 460).
The original instructions for imageability ratings were devel-
oped by Paivio et al. (1968) and were the following: “Nouns differ
in their capacity to arouse mental images of things or events.
Some words arouse a sensory experience, such as a mental picture
or sound, very quickly and easily, whereas others may do so only
with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or not at all. The purpose
of this experiment is to rate a list of words as to the ease or diffi-
culty with which they arouse mental images. Any word which, in
your estimation, arouses a mental image (i.e., a mental picture,
or sound, or other sensory experience) very quickly and easily
should be given a high imagery rating: any word that arouses a
mental image with difficulty or not at all should be given a low
imagery rating. Think of the words “apple” or “fact.” Apple would
probably arouse an image relatively easily and would be rated as
high imagery; fact would probably do so with difficulty and would
be rated as low imagery” (p. 4).
Both sets of instruction bias toward the sense of vision.
According to the concreteness instructions, something is con-
crete if it can be perceived through (at least one of) the senses.
However, as it is has been already pointed out (Connell and
Lynott, 2012, p. 461), the examples mentioned in the second
part of the definition (“objects, material or persons” as well as
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“chair” vs. “independence”) might have biased people to rely
for their ratings (also) on a different idea of concreteness which
resembles more closely the everyday understanding of the word
“concrete” and its dictionary definition, according to which “con-
crete” means material or physical and an object is concrete only if
it has a material composition. Since material objects are perceived
mainly or primarily through vision, people’s ratings probably
favored this sense over the others. Analogously to the instructions
for concreteness, the instruction for imageability also evoked an
idea of imageability that is primarily visual and related to the
ease/difficulty with which people can form a mental picture of
the referent of a word. Moreover, even though in Paivio’s view
“mental images” describe traces stored in memory of all kind of
sensations, the term “image” recalls quite strongly the idea of a
visual picture. Thus, for this aspect IMAG ratings follows criteria
that overlap that of concreteness, since the instances people can
more easily form a mental picture of are external, material things
that they can see.
However, despite what some studies maintain (e.g., Vigliocco
et al., 2009; Connell and Lynott, 2012), this is not the only relevant
aspect IMAG measures. Just as CONC also measures whether/in
what degree the referents of words can be experienced by senses
other than sight, so IMAG measures also whether/in what degree
a word arouses other kinds of sensory experience. More specifi-
cally, the request to estimate IMAG depending on whether/how
much a word arouses “sensory experience” without further spec-
ifications might have lead participants to assign their ratings on
the basis of the ease/difficulty with which words arouse any kind
of sensory experience stored inmemory, including internal, body-
related sensations. Following Paivio et al. (1968), Paivio (1986)
and Vigliocco et al. (2009), we propose that affective arousal is a
kind of sensory experience, based on internal feeling rather than
derived from the external senses.
A NEW HYPOTHESIS: LOOKING AT THE INCONSISTENCIES
FROM AN “INTERNAL” PERSPECTIVE
This idea that word meaning might rely jointly on both inter-
nal and external sensory experience suggests that IMAG ratings
might also track—at least in part—the internal and bodily-related
sensory experience evoked by words. If so, IMAG diverges from
CONC, and becomes a different, and more interesting measure
of both the external and the internal experiential grounding of
words. Since in our interpretation the imageability measure is
a result of ambiguous norming instructions that lead people to
assign ratings relying on their commonsense notion of sensory
information, as including both internal and external information
sources rather than solely external ones, we cannot assume that
it is perfectly accurate. However, if we assume that people do not
rely only on visual information to provide the ratings, but also
spontaneously took into account their internal sensory experi-
ence and thus assigned a certain degree of IMAG to all words that
aroused external and/or internal sensory experiences, then we can
account for the divergence between IMAG and CONC in the case
of emotion words.
If this hypothesis is correct, the class of emotion words should
not be the only terminological class exhibiting a significant diver-
gence between IMAG and CONC. In fact, all words that give
rise to some kind of internal sensory experience should have an
IMAG rating that is significantly higher than the CONC rating.
The more a word arouses internal sensory experience, the greater
should be the divergence between IMAG and CONC.
A word class that resembles emotion words insofar as it
denotes body-related conditions which are experienced inter-
nally is that class denoting proprioceptive and interoceptive states.
Proprioception and interoception are closely related notions: pro-
prioception indicates our aware experience of the position of
our body (see e.g., Berthoz, 2000); while interoception describe
people’s general conscious experience of their bodily states or
of specific conditions of parts of their body (Craig, 2003, 2009,
2010). Words describing typical proprioceptive states and intero-
ceptive states are e.g., balance, relaxation, movement, tremor, sit,
rest, jump, run, walk etc. on the one hand and on the other ache,
sick, hunger, thirsty, warmth, itch, pain, cold, etc.
Emotion, proprioceptive, and interoceptive words might how-
ever not be the only ones relying on internal, bodily-related
sensory experience. In fact, some recent studies carried out in the
field of so called embodied cognition suggest that abstract words
are also grounded in internal states, especially affective and men-
tal states (see e.g., Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Kousta
et al., 2009, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2009; for a review of older
studies see e.g., Barsalou, 1999, p. 599). In particular, the stud-
ies by Wiemer-Hastings et al. show that abstract words tend to
have more introspective and affective associations than concrete
words (Wiemer-Hastings and Xu, 2005; Vigliocco et al., 2009;
Kousta et al., 2011). As these studies suggest, abstract concepts
clearly cannot rely only on affective information, their repre-
sentation must also be based on linguistic information, and the
exact proportion of affective and linguistic information will vary
depending on the word (see e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2009; Kousta
et al., 2011). However, if we admit that abstract words do indeed
also rely at least minimally on internal sensory experience and
hypothesize that IMAG ratings measure whether a word arouses
internal sensory experience, then in the case of abstract words
the correlation between CONC and IMAG should be significantly
smaller than in the case of concrete words because IMAG ratings
should be relatively higher than CONC ratings.
Some results in line with this prediction were already reported
by Altarriba et al. (1999) and by Wiemer-Hastings et al. (2001);
however a more accurate analysis is needed. According to our
hypothesis, correlation patterns should differ when calculated
separately for decreasing CONC ratings: the more abstract a word
is, the weaker the correlation between CONC and IMAG should
become. In addition, since the proportion of affective and lin-
guistic information abstract words rely on varies depending on
the kind of words we are considering, we expect that highly theo-
retical words with a technical meaning that have only a limited
everyday use and strictly depend on their linguistic definition
(e.g., adverb, literal, plenipotentiary, causality, regulation, abduc-
tion, deduction, axiom, factor, fallacy, function, suffrage etc.) will
have relatively low IMAG ratings with respect to CONC ratings.
More specifically, since their proportion of linguistic informa-
tion is particularly high in comparison to sensory information,
if our hypothesis about IMAG is correct, the difference between
the IMAG ratings and the CONC ratings for this class of words
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should be either smaller than, or comparable to, that of other
word groups.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
To prove our hypothesis, we analyzed the CONC and the IMAG
ratings included in the MRC database, which is an important
source for these measures in psycholinguistic studies and con-
stitutes the only database available in which CONC and IMAG
were collected simultaneously by the same studies. These not only
rely on exactly the same instruction we discussed previously, but
were also driven by the intent of understanding the relationship
between IMAG and CONC.
Later collection of IMAG and CONC ratings available in
English are not directly relevant with respect to our hypothesis for
a number of reasons. First of all, recent collections of IMAG rat-
ings do not also include CONC ratings (Bird et al., 2001; Cortese
and Fugett, 2004; Stadthagen-Gonzalez and Davis, 2006; Schock
et al., 2012). Since the clue to understand the theoretical pecu-
liarities of the construct of imageability resides in the anomalies
with respect to concreteness, it is by considering the imageability
ratings in relation to the concreteness ratings—i.e., by comparing
them—that a new insight into the construct of imageability can
be achieved. Secondly, some collections rely on instructions that
differ at least in some respect from the one we discussed: this is
the case for the recently published database of CONC (Brysbaert
et al., 2013) as well as for the collection of IMAG ratings car-
ried out by Bird et al. (2001)2. Thirdly, some of these collections
are very specific in scope and consider only monosyllabic and
disyllabic words (Cortese and Fugett, 2004; Schock et al., 2012).
Finally, Stadthagen-Gonzalez’s and Davis’ database is obtained
merging their data with Gilhooly and Logie’s (1980) collection,
which is already included in the MRC database.
The MRC psycholinguistic database includes 9240 words pos-
sessing an IMAG rating and 8228 words possessing a CONC
rating. Both are derived from merging three sets of norms: the
Colorado Norms (Toglia and Battig, 1978), the Pavio Norms
(unpublished, these are an expansion of the norms of Paivio et al.,
1968), and the Gilhooly-Logie norms (Gilhooly and Logie, 1980).
A large part of the data from Toglia and Battig (1978) was vali-
dated by Cortese and Fugett (2004). The values are in the range
100–700.Words are partitioned in ten syntactic categories: nouns,
adjectives, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, pronouns, interjections,
past participles, other.
SELECTION OF STIMULI
For our analysis we considered only words that have both an
IMAG and a CONC rating and we excluded conjunctions, pro-
nouns, interjections, and the class labeled “other.” Repetitions
were also excluded. This leaves 4260 words.
Across all words, mean IMAG and CONC ratings are 456.4 and
438.7 respectively. The correlation between IMAG and CONC is
2The new instructions for concreteness are particularly problematic since they
ask people to evaluate actions as something concrete equating them from a
semantic point of view with objects. A study specifically devoted to the role
of instructions in collecting useful psycholinguistic data on concreteness is in
preparation.
significant (r = 0.835, p < 0.001), which demonstrates—as has
been previously observed—that the two constructs are tightly
interconnected. Interestingly, if two groups of words are con-
strued as a function of CONC (low vs. high CONC ratings, 2130
words in each group; mean CONC and IMAG ratings for the
low CONC group: 331.6 and 376.6, respectively; mean CONC
and IMAG ratings for the high CONC group: 545.8 and 536.3,
respectively), the correlation between IMAG and CONC for the
low CONC group (r = 0.550, p < 0.001) is significantly smaller
than the correlation between IMAG and CONC for the high
CONC group (r = 0.661, p < 0.001), z = 5.7, p < 0.0013. This
is compatible with the view that IMAG ratings are less dependent
upon CONC ratings for the abstract (i.e., low concrete) words
with respect to the concrete words. Since, as specified in sec-
tion Instruction-Bound Ratings?, abstract words generally rely on
more introspective information than concrete words, these dif-
ferent correlation patterns suggest that IMAG does not entirely
depend on CONC, but it is also a measure of something else,
and specifically of the ease/difficulty with which a word evokes
internal sensory experience of any kind (be it e.g., emotional,
proprioceptive or interoceptive).
To test the hypothesis that IMAG ratings depend on the
ease/difficulty with which a word arouses both external and/or
internal sensory experience, and that a discrepancy between
CONC and IMAG may be diagnostic of the relative contribution
of the two kinds of sensory information, we selected three groups
of words: (i) 36 emotional words (whose anomalous behavior as
for their IMAG and CONC ratings has already been singled out by
other studies—on this point see section Imageability in the MRC
Psycholinguistic Database), (ii) 56 proprioceptive or interocep-
tive words (which we call globally X-ceptive to indicate that the
same considerations we develop for proprioception and intero-
ception should apply for any kind of states based on an internal
perception), and (iii) 110 theoretical terms (i.e., abstract tech-
nical terms whose meaning is not grounded on internal states,
but depends rather on a linguistic definition given in the frame-
work of a theory). In addition, we construed ten control groups
of 100 randomly selected words to compare with (i), (ii), and
(iii). Selection of the words to serve in the control groups was
accomplished through a computerized algorithm, with the only
restriction that none of the words in the emotional, X-ceptive or
theoretical group could be selected to serve in the control groups.
(i) The class of emotion words combines two kinds of words:
those strictly denoting emotions and those denoting what are
more correctly called moods (or background feelings—e.g.,
depression, anxiety, wellness, distress, etc.). In order to individu-
ate a particularly salient and unambiguous set of terms, our selec-
tion from the MRC database was based on the emotions/moods
described by a number of studies (which sometimes consider a
mixture of the two). As for emotions, we included only emotions
considered as basic (Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Ekman et al., 1969;
Plutchik, 1980; Ekman, 1999; Reizenzein, 2009; Kassam et al.,
3Correlation were compared according to the following procedure. First r val-
ues have been converted into z values (Fisher r to z transformation), then the
results have been compared taking into consideration the sample size (Cohen
and Cohen, 1983).
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2013). While the words denoting basic emotions are all strictly
derived from thementioned studies, the list of the words denoting
moods is more freely composed starting from the examples and
the definitions given in various studies (Ekman, 1994; Damasio,
1999; Prinz, 2004). Emotion words strongly rely on internal affec-
tive experience; thus, if IMAG ratings measure how easily a word
evokes not only external but also internal sensory information,
IMAG ratings for this class of words should be significantly higher
than CONC ratings compared to the other groups of words.
(ii) Words denoting proprioceptive and interoceptive
(X-ceptive) states were selected from the MRC database starting
from the examples considered in the studies of Berthoz (2000)
and Craig (2003, 2009, 2010). Since proprioceptive and intero-
ceptive (X-ceptive) states are analogous to emotions due to the
fact that they are based on internal sensory experience, we expect
words denoting these states to behave like emotion words and
exhibit IMAG ratings significantly higher than CONC ratings
with respect to other groups of words.
iii) For the selection of theoretical words we could not rely
on previous studies, even though the definition of a class of
theoretical terms as opposed to a class of observational terms
was already introduced by Paivio (Paivio, 1986, p. 10 Clark and
Paivio, 1989). However, while Paivio interpreted theoretical terms
simply as abstract terms, we consider theoretical terms as an
autonomous subclass of abstract words. In our account, theo-
retical terms are technical words with a definitional structure
whose meaning is fixed in the framework of a theory. We iden-
tified this group of words one by one in the database according
to this criterion: the chosen terms belong to the technical jargon
of a discipline and therefore strictly depend on a specific linguis-
tic definition. Thus, we avoided terms that denote anything that
can be perceived through the senses. An example is the mathe-
matical term “axiom,” i.e., a statement or formula on which an
abstractly defined structure is based. Other than frommathemat-
ics, terms come from physics (e.g., “causality”), linguistics (e.g.,
“conjugation”), politics and law (e.g., “legislation”), logic (e.g.,
“deduction”), and science in general (e.g., “theory”). Since this
class should rely only very weakly on internal sensory experience,
will have relatively low IMAG ratings with respect to CONC rat-
ings. Specifically, we expect that the difference between the IMAG
ratings and the CONC ratings for this class of words will be
either smaller than, or comparable to, that of other word groups
(control groups as well as emotion and X-ception words).
PROCEDURE
We compared the differences between ratings of IMAG and
CONC of these three groups against the differences between the
ratings of IMAG and CONC of ten control groups including
100 randomly selected words (basically, a bootstrap). The idea
here is that the mean differences between IMAG and CONC
of the control groups—being composed of randomly selected
words—reflect the mean differences between IMAG and CONC
of the population they derived from. Therefore, if one (or more)
of the three experimental groups consistently and significantly
differs from the control group(s), then we can conclude that
that experimental group differs from the population on the
tested dimensions. The comparisons were made using an ANOVA
with Group [experimental (X-ception, emotion, or technical) vs.
control (each of the 10 control groups)] as a between-items factor.
In addition, each of the experimental groups was compared with
the other two experimental groups.
RESULTS
The results are reported in Table 1. The first 10 rows refer to the
comparison of each experimental group of words with one of the
control groups. The last two rows refer to the comparison among
the experimental groups of words.
As expected, the differences between IMAG and CONC for the
X-ception words are significantly higher than those of the control
groups. Also, and in line with previous evidence, the differences
between IMAG and CONC for the emotion words are signifi-
cantly higher than those of the control groups. In addition, and
congruently with the theory at the basis of our hypothesis, the dif-
ferences between IMAG and CONC for the theoretical/technical
words are either smaller than, or comparable to, those of the
control groups. Unexpectedly, the differences between IMAG and
CONC of the X-ception words are significantly smaller than those
of the emotion words: This will be dealt with in the General
Discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
According to the hypothesis we put forward, IMAG is a construct
based on two factors. On the one hand, IMAGdepends onCONC,
since it measures the ease/difficulty with which a word evokes
external (mainly visual) sensory experience related to the objects
it denotes. On the other hand, IMAG is partially independent of
CONC andmeasures the ease/difficulty with which a word evokes
internal sensory experience. To test this hypothesis we used the
IMAG and CONC ratings included in the MRC database. Since
we assume that IMAG is always linked to CONC and that IMAG
ratings will therefore always reflect to a certain extent CONC
ratings, we are not interested in analyzing IMAG and CONC
ratings per se, but we focus on the difference between IMAG
and CONC ratings which reveals a value of IMAG independent
from CONC.
Our analysis started from some basic assumptions regard-
ing what type of information different classes of words rely on.
Indeed, words might be grounded on both external or inter-
nal sensory information: (a) while concrete words rely primarily
on external sensory information, in general abstract words are
mainly based, to a larger or smaller extent, on internal sen-
sory information and on linguistic information. (b) Among the
abstract terms that surely rely for a large part on internal sensory
information there are words denoting emotions as well as propri-
oceptive and interoceptive states. (c) On the contrary, theoretical
words denoting technical notions will probably be mainly linguis-
tic constructs and be based only to a very small extent on sensory
information of any kind.
(a) Moving from this premise, we examined first of all whether
in general the correlation between CONC and IMAG varies for
concrete and abstract words. While in the case of concrete words,
IMAG ratings should be just a function of CONC ratings, in the
case of abstract words which rely to a certain degree on internal
information the correlation between CONC and IMAG should
be significantly smaller. Our analysis on two groups of words
constructed as a function of CONC confirmed this hypothesis.
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Table 1 | Results of the ANOVAs.
X-ceptions Emotion Theoretical
N = 56 N = 36 N = 110
M = 72.4 M = 119.0 M = −1.3
CI = 62, 83 CI = 95, 143 CI = −12, 9
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
ps
1 F 45.7 75.8 3.0
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 12.4 MSE 2829 3963 3280
CI = 0.6, 24 P <0.001 <0.001 =0.083
2 F 51.8 77.4 0.1
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 1.4 MSE 3494 4728 3773
CI = −12, 15 P <0.001 <0.001 =0.745
3 F 23.6 48.9 8.0
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 23.1 MSE 3704 4969 3929
CI = 9, 37 P <0.001 <0.001 <0.01
4 F 30.8 58.0 5.6
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 18.5 MSE 3396 4615 3700
CI = 5, 32 P <0.001 <0.001 <0.05
5 F 25.2 54.5 12.2
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 26.8 MSE 2973 4128 3387
CI = 15, 39 P <0.001 <0.001 <0.005
6 F 37.3 63.3 2.1
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 11.1 MSE 3615 4866 3862
CI = −3, 25 P <0.001 <0.001 =0.147
7 F 46.2 74.1 1.4
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 8.54 MSE 3171 4356 3533
CI = −4, 21 p <0.001 <0.001 =0.231
8 F 47.3 74.5 0.9
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 6.7 MSE 3276 4477 3611
CI = −6, 20 P <0.001 <0.001 =0.332
9 F 30.8 59.0 6.7
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 19.9 MSE 3209 4400 3562
CI = 7, 32 P <0.001 <0.001 <0.05
10 F 48.9 78.5 2.0
N = 100 dof 1, 154 1, 134 1, 208
M = 0.85 MSE 2878 4020 3317
CI = −2, 22 P <0.001 <0.001 =0.161
X-ceptions F 16.2 79.9
N = 56 dof 1, 90 1, 164
M = 72.4 MSE 2926 2528
CI = 62, 83 P <0.001 <0.001
Emotion F 110.9
N = 36 dof 1, 144
M = 119.0 MSE 3542
CI = 95, 143 P <0.001
N, size of the sample; M, mean differences between imageability and concrete-
ness ratings (ratings from the MRC psycholinguistic database); CI, Confidence
Intervals (95%); Once corrected for multiple comparisons, separately for each
conceptual category, α = 0.005.
(b) Secondly, we selected two groups of words from the
database, one denoting emotions and the other propriocep-
tive/interoceptive (x-ceptive) states. Since these classes of words
rely to a large degree on internal information, we expected that
the difference between IMAG and CONC for both classes would
be significantly higher than that for the control groups. Our
statistical analysis supports this hypothesis.
An unexpected finding here is that the difference between
IMAG and CONC for the X-ception words is significantly smaller
than that for the emotion words. There are at least two possible
explanations for this result.
First, one could speculate that it is due to the fact that emo-
tions rely on internal bodily information in a twofold manner.
On the one hand, an emotional state is revealed by a specific
affective arousal and internal feelings. On the other hand, emo-
tions bring about specific bodily reactions and above all specific
facial expressions which are an essential part of emotions (see
e.g., Ekman, 1984) and are recorded through interoception giv-
ing additional bodily information on the state. Thus, one could
hypothesize that the higher difference between IMAG and CONC
for emotion words compared with x-ceptive words is due to this
double binding between emotions and internal sensory experi-
ence: in this case, mean IMAG ratings for emotion words should
be higher than those for X-ception words, whereas mean CONC
ratings for the two classes of words should be similar. A second
possible explanation is that the sensory information correspond-
ing to proprioceptive and interoceptive states (i.e., internal world
perception) is “qualitatively comparable” to (external world-)
perception and is therefore interpreted as more concrete than
the affective arousal/feelings corresponding to emotions. That is,
people could consider words like “ache,” “hunger,” “cold,” “hot,”
“motion,” “itch” as denoting more tangible and specific (i.e.,
concrete) states than words like “happiness,” “sadness,” “excite-
ment,” “humiliation,” “jealousy” etc. As a consequence, in this
case CONC ratings of X-ceptive words should be higher than
those of emotional words, whereas mean IMAG ratings for the
two classes of words should be similar.
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, we performed
two ANOVAs. In one analysis, we compared the CONC ratings of
X-ception and emotion words. This analysis showed that the con-
creteness ratings of X-ception words was significantly higher than
the concreteness ratings of emotion words (means: 391 vs. 314,
respectively; [F(1, 90) = 39.4,MSE= 3334, p < 0.001]. In the sec-
ond analysis we compared the IMAG ratings of X-ception and
emotion words. This second analysis showed that the imageabil-
ity ratings of X-ception words was significantly higher than the
imageability ratings of emotion words [464 vs. 433, respectively,
F(1, 90) = 7.2, MSE= 2904, p < 0.01]. Unfortunately, these anal-
yses do not allow us to conclusively decide in favor of either of the
two hypotheses put forward above, since both IMAG and CONC
ratings are lower for emotion words with respect to X-ception
words. It is worth noting that the difference between the mean
CONC ratings of the two classes of words is larger than the dif-
ference between the mean IMAG ratings, and this, if anything,
provides (weak) support for the second of our hypotheses.
(c) Finally, we selected from the database a group of
theoretical/technical words which should only weakly rely on
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internal information and therefore have relatively low IMAG
ratings with respect to CONC ratings. Congruently with this
hypothesis, the differences between IMAG and CONC for the the-
oretical/technical words turned out to be either smaller (4 out
of 10 comparisons are significant if α = 0.05; 1 out of 10
comparisons are significant once α is corrected for multiple
comparisons4; c.f. Table 1) then or comparable to those of the
control groups.
Taken together, these results show that IMAG is not simply
an alternative way to measure concreteness, but, instead, that
IMAG provides specific information and depends in part on the
strength with which words evoke body-internal sensations. We
think that this result is extremely useful, among other things, for
better understanding how to use IMAG and CONC ratings for
experimental research.
One of the main applications of these ratings is in studies
that analyze the processing advantages of some classes of words
over others; most famously, the processing advantages of con-
crete vs. abstract words (the so-called concreteness effect). In this
case, our results suggest not only that the two ratings should not
be used interchangeably, but they also indicate that—in addi-
tion to a concreteness effect—it might be possible to identify an
effect specifically related to imageability (and more precisely to
“the side” of imageability that does not depend on concreteness),
which measures the ease/difficulty with which words evoke some
kind of internal sensory information. In this case, processing
advantages should be observed for both emotion and X-ceptive
words.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we analyzed the IMAG and CONC ratings included
in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database. We started by pre-
senting the results of some previous studies showing that—
even though there is a strong correlation between measures
of IMAG and CONC—some words with low CONC ratings
(i.e., abstract words) exhibit a contrasting pattern and have
relatively high IMAG ratings. Also on the basis of an anal-
ysis of the instructions given to subjects during the collec-
tion of the ratings, we hypothesized that IMAG is only in
part connected to CONC; while to a certain extent is inde-
pendent from it and measures something different: i.e., the
ease/difficulty with which a word arouses any kind of sensory
experience including internal, body-related sensations. In order
to validate this position, we carried out several analyses of the
IMAG and CONC ratings in the database, individuating different
groups of words and considering for each the difference between
IMAG and CONC. All the results are congruent with the initial
hypotheses.
These results show that IMAG ratings depend at least on two
factors: i.e., on the one hand, on whether a word denotes con-
crete external objects (and for this aspect IMAG directly relies on
CONC) and on the other, on whether a word is grounded in any
kind of internal, body-related sensations. As we showed, this is the
4Note that correcting for multiple comparisons is not necessary in this
context. We reported the corrected values to show that even with a more
conservative approach, the semantic of the pattern of results does not change.
case for words denoting e.g., emotions as well as proprioceptive
and interoceptive states.
This conclusion serves not only to reaffirm at least to some
degree the reliability of the IMAG measure, in spite of the well-
known inconsistencies that characterize it, which we interpreted
from an entirely new perspective, but it also has relevant conse-
quences at least with respect to two different points. On the one
hand, it challenges the widely shared idea that CONC and IMAG
are interchangeable scales measuring one and the same thing. On
the other hand, our analysis helps to clarify the IMAG construct
and to specify what it exactly measures. This has direct impli-
cation e.g. for the debate on the relationship between abstract
and concrete. According to Vigliocco, Kousta, and collaborators
(Vigliocco et al., 2009, 2013; Kousta et al., 2011) the dichotomy
between abstract and concrete words is only apparent, as word
meanings rely in different proportions on perception, internal
information, and linguistic information: thus, generally people
call “concrete” the words with an higher proportion of perceptual
information, while they call “abstract” the words relying primarily
on internal and linguistic information. Since imageability ratings
are a joint measure of the link of words with both external and
internal sensory experience, we suggest that the extent of a word’s
connection with internal sensory information can be obtained by
subtracting its concreteness rating from its imageability rating.
If the interpretation of imageability we put forward is correct,
then the intersection between imageability and concreteness can
indeed give us a tangible (even though not completely accurate)
measure of the internal sensory information aroused by a word.
Our analysis shows also that the imageability and even con-
creteness measures are complex and problematic constructs,
whose ratings undergo biases that cannot be completely con-
trolled. New collections of ratings on the basis of less ambiguous
instructions are required in order to have more precise mea-
sures to use for experimentation, i.e., to show among other things
whether an abstract word mainly rely on linguistic information
and is therefore theoretical or whether also an abstract word is
strongly grounded in internal information.
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